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Abstract: We explore brand level strategic interactions between skim/low fat and whole 
milk brands by estimating detailed price elasticity matrix using quadratic almost ideal 
demand system for eight major U.S. cities. Results of our analysis suggest that the market 
and demand behavior of skim/low fat and whole milk brands are different. Demand for 
skim/low fat milk is more elastic than in the case of whole milk. Highly inelastic demand 
for large number of Private label whole milk brands suggests ‘loss leader’ pricing strategy 
by the retailers. Such pricing strategy does not seem to be the norm in skim/low fat milk 
market. 
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 Strategic Implications of Retail Pricing in the U.S. Fluid Milk Market 
 
1. Introduction 
U.S. fluid milk markets are going through radical changes in terms of increasing 
concentration through mergers and acquisitions in the processing and retailing sectors.  
Our analysis, using proprietary IRI data, suggests that 4 firm concentration ratios in major 
U.S. cities can vary from 85% to 99%.  By any standard, these concentration numbers are 
high.  Also the relationships between pricing of top brands can also be quite complex.  In 
some cities pricing of branded milk is highly correlated.  For example, in one of the North 
East cities we find correlation coefficient between branded milks to be as high as 0.90.  On 
the other hand, in one Midwestern city, the average correlation coefficient between 
branded milks is 0.75.  Given this potential disparity in pricing mechanisms, it is important 
for us to understand the nature and causes of price determination in fluid milk market as 
part of the foundations for better public policy initiatives. 
Fluid milk processors and retailers in New England have recently come under 
increased scrutiny from state and federal regulatory agencies because of their alleged anti-
competitive market conduct (Cotterill et-al., 2002).  Our preliminary estimates of 
concentration across major U.S. cities are not really that different from the New England 
cities.  So, comprehensive research involving major cities across the U.S. is rather 
important at this point. Such disaggregated city level study is also important for policy 
analysis due to changes in Federal milk marketing order program (FMMO). Until now 
most FMMO policy simulations have used highly aggregated national or regional data and 
assuming a competitive market structure. By exploring different city level fluid milk 
markets using disaggregated data we plan to generate the empirical foundations for future 
  1research in FMMO policy simulation modeling based on disaggregated data and regional 
marketing behavior under assumptions of imperfect competition.    
In analyzing strategic market behavior economists have always been concerned 
about the impact of aggregation. Specifically in market level analysis, if different segments 
of the market behave differently then aggregation will not only hide the underlying 
differences but also may distort the findings for particular markets. Here we should 
mention that the data we are using is also aggregated. Our IRI database is aggregated at the 
city level.  But compared to most previous studies on the U.S. fluid milk market we are 
using more disaggregated data. This level of disaggregation allowing to explore market 
level behavior of brands within a city and can provide a view of strategic competition from 
the perspective of a brand manager. As more disaggregated data becomes available, we 
will explore issues related to strategic behavior using such data. For example, with retail 
chain level data within a city it is possible to explore brand level competition within a 
store, a perspective comparable to the view of pricing/brand competition from the 
perspective of a category manager within a supermarket.  
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to explore strategic behavior in 
fluid milk markets for 8 major U.S. cities using a single methodology. This allows for a 
more meaningful comparison across the different cities.  These cities are geographically 
dispersed and vary in terms of size from medium to large. Recently, studies by Dhar and 
Cotterill (2002) and Cotterill et-al. (2002) have explored similar strategic behavior issues 
as explored here, but only for the New England (mainly Boston) market.  The approach 
used in this paper will be similar to that used in the papers mentioned above in that we use  
highly disaggregated data. 
  2  While we explore strategic behavior across 8 U.S. cities using highly disaggregated 
data, space constraints limit the exploration of all the dimensions of strategic price 
competition in U.S. fluid milk markets.  One issue of specific interest is the nature and 
differences in price competition between skim/low fat and whole milk markets. Most 
studies and policy debates usually assume that the nature of competition in these two 
markets is the same. One of the reasons for this assumption is the fact that the retail prices 
between skim/low fat and whole milk is highly correlated. As a result firms are assumed to 
be pricing their skim/low fat milk and whole milk by the same pricing rules.  A more 
practical reason is to avoid major computational burdens using complex demand models, 
where aggregating skim/low fat and whole milk data in earlier studies helped to avoid 
‘curse of dimensionality’ problems associated with estimating large, disaggregated 
structural models. Thanks to recent computing advances, we estimate complex, 
disaggregated brand level demand models with large numbers of parameters with good 
accuracy and within a manageable time frame. In particular, we model and estimate brand 
level skim/low fat and whole milk demands separately and explore similarities and 
differences in the competitive pricing between these markets. If these two markets behave 
in the same way, then the estimated demand system should have similar behavioral 
patterns in terms of own and cross price elasticities. 
We use the quadratic almost ideal demand system (Q-AIDS) developed by Banks, 
Blundell and Lewbel (1997) to estimate detailed and disaggregated brand level demand 
systems for these regional milk markets.  Q-AIDS is a highly flexible and theoretically 
consistent demand system and is a significant over traditionally used AIDS. 
  3The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss our 
databases and the level of aggregation that we use. In section 3 we present our demand 
model and in section 4 we explain estimation procedure for estimating such demand 
system.  Section 5 presents our empirical demand specification. And section 6 discusses 
the results and in the last section 7 we present our concluding remarks. 
2.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We use retail scanner data from Information Resources Inc. to conduct exploratory 
market analysis and to estimate our demand system.  Our scanner database provides brand 
level milk prices and sales weekly from week ending 3/9/1997 to week ending 2/24/2002 
collected so as to be representative of the markets in our 8 cities. This IRI scanner database 
provides detailed brand and processor level information on sales and other merchandising 
information. We augment this database with wholesale level, administered milk price data 
from Federal Milk Marketing Order. In the case of Private Labels the database only 
identifies them by the retailers but not by the processor. So, we treat Private Label by a 
retailer as a brand in itself. In this paper we are interested in strategic issues, so to keep the 
analysis manageable we estimate our demand system using only the brands with at least 
5% market share.  Rest of the fringe brands are aggregated as an All-Other brand.  So, in 
the demand analysis the number of brands varies from city to city based on this criterion. 
Next, we will present descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis. 
  To give an idea of market size of each market we rank the cities by percentage of 
total population in the 8 cities. Total population in these 8 cities is 29.25 million.  Based on 
population we rank the cities and sort all the tables presented in this paper by the ascending 
order. So, the first city in any table is the smallest city and the last one is the largest. Due to 
  4confidentiality agreement with IRI we can not provide detailed information on specific 
city. Of these cities, 1 is from the Northeast census region (termed as NE_1 in the paper), 2 
are from the Midwest (e.g. MW_1 and MW_2), 3 are from the West census region and 2 
are from the South census region. 
  In tables 1 and 2 we present descriptive statistics of the variables used in our 
analysis. The average per gallon price of whole milk is highest in the West ($3.49/ gal) and 
lowest in the South ($2.48 /gal). For skim/low fat milk, the highest price is in the South 
($3.16) and the lowest is in the West ($2.36).  We are unable to discern patterns between 
city size and any of the variables presented in these two tables.  The patterns between 
whole milk and skim/low fat milk are somewhat clearer. The price of skim/low fat milk on 
an average is lower than the price of whole milk, partly reflecting a lower value due to 
lower fat content under FMMO pricing. In terms of packaging (i.e. volume per unit) whole 
milk tends to sell in larger package sizes. Similarly in the case of percentage volume sold 
through merchandising and the percentage of any price reduction (two of the proxy for 
marketing mix variables used in our regression analysis), we do not find any specific 
pattern across cities. We discuss some of these descriptive statistics in details in the section 
3 of the paper. 
3.   A Consumer Demand System for Multiple Milk Brands 
In this section we first describe our choice of demand system. Then we derive the 
analytical form of the post estimation measures and the price and expenditure elasticities. 
a.  Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System: 
To specify demand for different types of milk we use the quadratic almost ideal 
demand system (Q-AIDS).  Our non-parametric analysis of Engel curves suggests that 
  5relationship between per capita expenditure on any milk type and total per capita 
expenditure on milk is non-linear.  Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997) have shown that in 
the presence of such non-linear Engel curves use of rank 2 (for example: AIDS) demand 
system is inappropriate.  The Q-AIDS is the best available exactly aggregable demand 
system to capture any non-linear impacts of price and expenditure changes on demand.  
The demand generated by the Q-AIDS is of rank 3 which, as proved in Gorman (1981), is 
the maximum possible rank for any demand system that is linear in functions of income.  
Unlike the AIDS model (Deaton and Muelbauer, 1981) and the exactly aggregable 
Translog model of Jorgenson et al. (1982) the Q-AIDS model permits goods to be luxuries 
at some income level and necessities at others.     
Here, we first describe the derivations of a Q-AIDS demand system.  Let e(p, u) be 
the household expenditure function, where   is the (n×1) price vector of the (n×1) 
vector of consumption goods q .  Under the almost ideal class of demand systems, 
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α
T 1n = 1, β
T1n = 0, τ
T 1n = 0, Γ 1n = 0n (homogeneity/adding up), and Γ
T = Γ (symmetry). 
Letting M> 0 be household expenditure corresponding, the Marshallian demand 
specification in terms of expenditures shares w ≡ (p1 q1
*/x, …, pn qn
*/x)
T are 
(1)  w= α + Γ ln p + β [ln x – ln a(p)] + τ [ln x – ln a(p)]
2/c(p).    
  6In order to facilitate the empirical implementation one can also specify this demand 
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where p = (p1, …, pN)’ is a (N×1) vector of prices for q, and wilt = (pilt xilt/Mlt) is the budget 
share for the i
th commodity consumed in the l
th city at time t.  The term P, the price index 
can be expressed as: ln(Plt) = δ + ∑ =
N
1 m αm ln(pmlt) + 0.5 ∑ =
N
1 m ∑ =
N
1 j γmj ln(pmlt) ln(pjlt). 
The above AIDS specification (equation 2) can be modified to incorporate the effects 
of socio-demographic variables (Z1lt, …, ZKlt) on consumption behavior, where Zklt is the k
th 
socio-demographic variable in the l
th city at time t, k = 1, …, K.  This method, 
demographic translating, allows demographic differences to shift both the intercept and 
elasticity parameters.  Under demographic translating, αi is assumed to take the following 
form: αilt = α0i+  λ ∑ =
K
1 k ik Zklt, i = 1, …, N.  
b.  Using Q-AIDS to analyze substitution between milk types: 
From the estimating a Q-AIDS model, one can recover detailed compensated and 
un-compensated own and cross price elasticities, expenditure elasticities, and measures of 
consumer welfare.  The own and cross price elasticities allow us to analyze the substitution 
behavior of consumers between the different types of milk as a way of describing 
consumer demand for labeled milk.  In addition, the literature suggests that labeled milk 
should be a luxury good, a proposition which can be approximately analyzed with the 
expenditure elasticity.  Together these elasticities describe the patterns of consumer 
willingness to pay for labeled milk. 
  7Differentiating the demand system (equation 1) w.r.t. lnp and lnM we get price and 
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− = ij where δ  is the Kronecker delta.   
4. Estimation Procedures for the Demand System 
  A number of previous studies have found problems with the endogeneity of price 
and expenditure in estimating demand systems using aggregate scanner data such as those 
used in this study (see e.g., Dhar, Chavas and Gould, 2003).  Thus, our estimation 
procedure for the Q-AIDS demand system, equation (2), needs to include an additional set 
of equations to control for endogeneity of the prices and expenditures.
i  We estimate our 
demand equations, reduced form price equations, and expenditure equation using a full 
information maximum likelihood estimation method.  Due to adding up restrictions of the 
Q-AIDS demand system we drop one demand equation and estimate a system with N-1 
demand equations, N reduced form price equations, and 1 expenditure equation, where N is 
the number of brands with market shares greater than 5%. 
The reduced form price equations used to control for price endogeneity for each 
milk brands are specified to capture the supply side of the price formation mechanism.  
The price equation for the i
th commodity in the l
th city at time t is:  
(5) p ilt = f(supply/demand shifters). 
  8In equation (5) supply/demand shifters would include variables to describe raw material, 
product manufacturing, and packaging costs.   Following Blundell and Robin we specify a 
reduced form expenditure equation where household expenditure in the l
th city at time t is a 
function of median household income and a time trend: 
(6) M lt = f(time trend, income).   
Given these reduced form specifications for the price and expenditure equations, we 
estimate jointly (2), (5) and (6) by FIML.  The resulting parameter estimates have desirable 
asymptotic properties (Amemiya). 
  To control for city specific variations, we modify the Q-AIDS specification with 
demographic translating variables (Z1lt, …, ZKlt).  As a result, our AIDS model incorporates 
a set of seasonal dummy variables along with socio-demographic variables.  To control for 
seasonal differences by city we incorporate four seasonal dummy variables in each of the 
Q-AIDS equations.  Also to maintain theoretical consistency of the AIDS model, the 
following restrictions are applied to demographic translating parameter α0i: 
(7)  α0i =  ,  ∑ =
4
1 r r irD d 1
4
1 = ∑ = r ir d , i = 1,…, N,  
where dir is the parameter for the i
th brand associated with the seasonal dummy variable Dr 
for the r
th season.  Note that as a result, our demand equations do not have intercept terms. 
5. Empirical  Specifications 
Translating 
Our translating specification (e.g. αilt = α0i+ ∑ =
K
1 k λik Zklt) has four quarterly 
dummies and two continuous variables.  These two variables are: the monthly wage rate in 
the city and the consumer price index.  The seasonal dummies will be able to capture any 
seasonal variations in a given city. The wage rate variable captures any impact of change in 
  9income on milk consumption. And lastly the consumer price index can capture any 
exogenous shocks in other markets on the consumption of milk. 
Price Specification 
Most recent studies of differentiated products have modeled price as a function of 
supply and demand shifters, assuming these shifters are exogenous to the price formation 
mechanism (e.g., Cotterill, Franklin and Ma; Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar; and Kadiyali, 
Vilcassim and Chintagunta).  On average raw milk prices tend to be ~60% of the retail 
milk prices.
ii  Other retailing and processing costs include merchandising and packaging 
costs.  Therefore we specify the price functions, equation (5), with raw milk price, 
marketing and other product characteristics as explanatory variables: 
(8)
[ ] ilt i ilt i ilt i lt i ilt i ilt i i ilt UPV PRD p wage p C p C p 6 5 1 4 3
2
2 1 0 ) ln( ) ln( ) _ ln( ) _ ln( ) ln( θ θ θ θ θ θ θ + + + + + + = −
  
where pilt is the price of milk type i, in city l and at time t.  C_plt is the price of announced 
cooperative class I milk price in city l at time t.  Similarly, wagelt is the wage rate in city l 
at time t.  pilt-1 is the lagged retail price.
iii  And UPVilt in is the unit volume of the i
th 
product in the l
th city at time t and represents the average size of the purchase.  For 
example, if a consumer purchases only one gallon bottles of a brand, then unit volume for 
that brand will be just one.  Conversely, if this consumer buys a half-gallon bottle then the 
unit volume will be 2.  This variable is used to capture packaging-related cost variations, as 
smaller package size per volume implies higher costs to produce, to distribute and to 
shelve.  The variable PRDilt is the percent price reduction of brand i and is used to capture 
any costs associated with specific price reductions (e.g., aisle end displays, freestanding 
newspaper inserts).   
  10Expenditure 
Similarly the reduced form expenditure function in (6) is specified as: 
(9)  lt lt lt t lt idx C wage x TR x _ ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 4 3 1 2 1 0 ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ + + + + = −  t = 1,…, 260.  
where ψ0 is the intercept term.  TRt is a linear trend, capturing any time specific 
unobservable effect on consumer milk expenditures.  The variable wagelt is the average 
wage rate in city l and is used as a proxy to capture the effect of income differences on 
milk purchases.  C_idxlt is the city level consumer price index; this variable captures any 
city level overall supply shocks to consumers.  
  We assume the demand shifters and the variables in the reduced form price and 
expenditure specification are exogenous.  In general the reduced form specifications (i.e. 
equation (8) and (9)) are always identified, although the issue of parameter identification is 
rather complex in such a non-linear structural model.
iv  We checked the order conditions 
for identification that would apply to a linearized version of the demand equations (2) and 
found them to be satisfied.  Finally, we did not encounter numerical difficulties in 
implementing the FIML estimation.  As suggested by Mittelhammer, Judge and Miller 
(p.474-475) we interpret this as evidence that each of the demand equations is identified.
v 
6. Empirical  Results 
From tables 1 and 2 we find that, on an average, the level of merchandising and 
price reduction is higher in skim/low fat milk than in whole milk.  This suggests that the 
nature of competition is more intense in skim/low fat milk than in whole milk and/or that 
skim/low fat milks are used as loss leaders. Further exploration of the nature of 
competition between whole and skim/low fat milk market segments requires us to use the 
results from our regression analysis. 
  11In tables 3 and 4 we provide average own and cross price elasticities across cities.  
Due space limitations we do not provide detailed regression nor the elasticity estimate 
results by city.
vi For all cities, own price elasticities are more elastic for skim/low fat milk 
than for whole milks. Average own price elasticity across cities for whole milk is -1.39 and 
for skim/low fat milk is -2.21.  Tables 3 and 4 also summarize minimum and maximum for 
the own price elasticity estimates. Again we find a lower spread in the case of skim/low fat 
milk than in the case of whole milk. Our estimated own price elasticities in the case of 
skim/low fat milk are all significant at the 5% level, but this is not the case for whole milk 
brands. Highlighted elasticity estimates in the maximum and minimum columns of Tables 
3 and 4 are all significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  
We can also look at the nature of competition by the magnitudes of the estimated 
cross price elasticities. Again we find the similar pattern.  Average cross price elasticies for 
skim/low fat milk are slightly larger (0.28) than for whole milk (0.23). Following a 
business literature rule of thumb that cross price elasticities greater than 0.5 significant 
competition (Keat and Young, p. 121). Except in our smallest market (Midwest), we do not 
find average cross price elasticities to be greater than 0.5.
vii 
Next, we explore the nature of pricing competition based on our estimated mark-
ups. In literature on differentiated product markets Bertrand competition is usually 
accepted as the best approximation of market competition (Nevo, 2001). So, in this paper 
we estimate non-competitive markups assuming Bertrand competition. In a differentiated 








where p is retail price, c is marginal cost and  ii η  is the own price elasticity. We only 
estimate Bertrand markups in the case where own price elasticities are greater than one in 
  12absolute value, i.e., where demand is elastic. In a non-competitive market inelastic demand 
implies marginal revenue to be negative. A profit maximizing firm will not produce at a 
level where marginal revenue becomes negative. So, estimating any form of profit 
maximizing markups where firms are selling in the inelastic portion of the demand 
function is meaningless.  
We also estimate an upper bound markup based on the available data. Our database 




, where RP is the retail milk price and COOP is the cooperative milk price. 
In the supermarket fresh milk category, raw milk prices tend to be 62% of the total milk 
price.
viii Actual channel markups should be less than this estimated upper bound raw 
markup as shelf milk also includes other costs. So, we eliminate any estimated Bertrand 
markup that is greater than estimated raw markup upper bound. In terms of raw markup, 
the average raw markup for skim/low fat milk is 0.49 and for whole milk is 0.52. In the 
case of Bertrand markup, it is 0.37 for skim/low fat and 0.38 for whole milk.   The 
estimated Bertrand markup is quite high compared to the upper bound, suggesting 
processors with profit objectives tend to make significant profits in these markets. These 
average mark-ups also do not suggest any major differences in the markets for skim/low 
fat and whole milk, implying aggregation of markups at this level are likely hiding the 
distinct differences in pricing and demand that are indicated by the elasticity estimates.  
In tables 3 and 4 we also provide the number of brands that have inelastic brand 
demands.  There are more brands in the whole milk category (19 brands) that have inelastic 
demand compare to 8 skim/low fat milk brands (8 brands). All these inelastic brands are 
Private Labels. We know the theory of profit maximization firms do not maximizes profits 
  13when the demand is inelastic. If a firm is selling at the inelastic portion of the demand 
function this implies the firm is either building market share treating this product as loss 
leader or building store traffic with this brand or product. This implies Private Label 
brands are used more prominently as strategic baits by retailers to attract consumers, i.e., in 
marketing jargon Private Labels can be termed as ‘loss leaders’.   
To show the differences more clearly we present in tables 5 and 6 detailed 
estimated elasticities for two of the comparable representative cities. They are NE_1 and 
MW_1. These 2 cities are comparable in terms of size and market concentrations (market 
concentration numbers are presented in table 7). But based on brand level elasticity 
estimates they are quite different. In both markets branded milks are significantly elastic 
with higher elasticities for skim/low fat milk. In the case of Private label, we get very 
different results. In NE_1, one private label skim/low fat and all the private label whole 
milk have inelastic demand. This is not the case in MW_1. In MW_1 all the private labels 
have elastic demand. But here also, private label whole milk brands are less elastic than 
skim/low fat milk.  
  We do not find any specific pattern of own and cross price elasticities across cities 
based on market size. In I/O literature it is also common explore strategic market 
differences using market concentration indices. So, we develop different measures of 
concentration across cities and explore relationships between concentration measures and 
elasticity estimates in tables 3 and 4. Concentration measures are the main building blocks 
in exploring market structure and conduct under structure conduct-performance (SCP) 
methodology in industrial organization literature. We measure concentrations both at the 
retail and at the processor level.  Our different measures of concentration are presented in 
  14Table 7.  Our database does not allow us to identify any specific Private Label processors. 
So, in calculating measures processors level concentrations we total Private Label volume 
sales as a single entity.
ix  Based on this assumption we estimate three measures of 
processor level concentration: the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), CR4 and CR2. The 
IRI database also provides major retail chains Private Label volume sales data.  So, in 
column 5 table 7 we provide the number major Private Label brands in that market.  And, 
in column 6 we provide information on Private Label share of the total market. 
  To get an indication of the independent processor level market share, we provide 
market share of the top 2 processors in any given market.  In terms of Private Label share 
the largest share (82%) is in the West and the lowest share (39%) is in the Midwest.  
Similarly we calculate the share of the top 2 brands. We explore relationships between 
elasticity measures and different measures of market concentration using different 
exploratory data analysis methodology (such as: ANOVA, cluster analysis).  We are 
unable to discernible any meaningful relationships.  
  By any measure, the concentration in these markets is significantly high. The 
theory of differentiated product oligopolistic markets suggests that, in any highly 
concentrated market, strategic behavior of market players can be quite involved. So it is 
not surprising that we do not find any meaningful relationships between estimated 
elasticity measures and concentration measures at the aggregated (versus) branded market 
level. 
7. Concluding  Remarks 
Our analysis in this paper does suggest significant differences in the nature of demand for 
skim/low fat and whole milk. Overall the whole milk market is much less price responsive. 
  15A lot of the brands are sold at a price level where demand is inelastic, suggesting a loss 
leader pricing strategy by channel players. On the other hand skim/low fat milk markets 
are more strategically competitive. This result conforms to the anecdotal evidence from the 
market. Large families and families with children tend to consume more whole milk. So, to 
attract these consumers, retailers can use whole milk as loss leader. It is known that high 
income consumers tend to be much more health conscious and as a result they tend to 
consume more skim/low fat milk. So, skim/low fat milk can be priced much more 
strategically.  
  In recent New Empirical Industrial Organization literature it is argued that strategic 
behavior in the market can be best analyzed using disaggregated data and estimating 
detailed brand level demand models. Such demand models provide detailed strategic inter 
relations between brands based on estimated own and cross price elasticities (Nevo, 2001) 
and provide insights into consumer welfare (Hausman and Leonard, 2002; Dhar and Foltz, 
2003). Our multi-market analysis also suggests that results and inferences based on 
aggregated concentration and margin indices may hide such strategic inter relationships 
between different brands. Hence, we find evidence that milk market analysis with 
aggregated data can be problematic as there are rich patterns of strategic behavior in 
different markets hat are likely to remain hidden.  In particular, our analysis shows that the 
Skim/low fat and whole milk brands behave differently in the market place.  Given 
significant differences in the skim/low fat and whole milk markets, in future research and 
policy analysis these differences should be taken into account. .
  16 
Table 1: Average Price and other Scanner Data Descriptive by City [S/L Milk] 
WE_3 2.36 0.92 30.8 20.8 0.86 1.3
MW_2 2.66 0.8 19.3 11.6 0.75 1.4
WE_2 3.01 0.73 24.9 27.9 0.84 1.3
WE_1 2.59 0.83 42.9 25.2 0.77 1.3
SO_2 3.16 0.84 14.7 22.7 0.64 1.5
SO_1 2.55 0.81 33.8 22.5 0.55 1.4
NE_1 2.90 0.71 15.9 13.4 0.69 1.5
MW_1 2.92 0.81 24.9 22.1 0.78 1.4
% vol 
Merchandisin













Table 2: Average Price and other Scanner Data Descriptive by City [Whole Milk] 















WE_3  2.81 0.85  14.60  14.26  0.14 1.30 
MW_2  2.89 0.78  13.84  10.73  0.25 1.39 
WE_2  3.49 0.67  11.97  23.87  0.16 1.35 
WE_1  2.74 0.81  24.26  20.09  0.23 1.35 
SO_2  3.13 0.79  14.59  21.12  0.36 1.49 
SO_1  2.48 0.84  30.19  27.65  0.45 1.43 
NE_1  2.90 0.71  7.45  11.23  0.31 1.46 
MW_1  3.01 0.78  27.49  23.16  0.22 1.42 
 
  17Table 3: Average Elasticity Measures by City-Skim/low fat Milk  
WE_3 52 - 1 . 9 8 -1.30 -3.68 0 0.31 36% 50%
MW_2 51 - 2 . 3 2 -1.19 -5.76 0 0.52 24% 51%
WE_2 42 - 1 . 0 1 -1.01 -3.73 0 0.22 35% 44%
WE_1 53 - 1 . 2 9 -1.27 -4.65 0 0.33 42% 53%
SO_2 56 - 2 . 9 6 -0.28 -2.27 3 0.20 45% 48%
SO_1 76 - 3 . 2 6 -0.17 -1.69 40 . 1 0-5 5 %
NE_1 74 - 1 . 7 4 -0.33 -3.60 1 0.20 46% 45%























Table 4: Average Elasticity Measures by City-Whole Milk 
WE_3 52 - 1 . 3 9 -0.40 -3.11 2 0.28 32% 50%
MW_2 51 - 1 . 8 5 -0.36 -5.21 1 0.60 39% 53%
WE_2 42 - 0 . 9 7 0.03 -1.79 2 0.03 56% 42%
WE_1 53 - 0 . 7 5 -0.60 -2.96 2 0.25 34% 52%
SO_2 56 - 1 . 4 2 -0.14 -1.50 40 . 1 1-5 1 %
SO_1 76 - 0 . 7 9 -0.01 -1.88 40 . 0 9-6 1 %
NE_1 74 - 1 . 5 2 -0.08 -3.34 4 0.17 31% 54%






















  18Table 5: Detailed Price Elasticity Matrix for NE_1 
        BR_1 BR_2 PL_1          PL_2 PL_3 PL_4 All-Other
S/L W S/L W S/L W S/L W S/L W S/L W S/L  W
BR_1  -2.27                            -1.38 0.69 0.38 -0.13 -0.44 0.10 -0.38 0.09 -0.16 0.19 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02
   0.24                            0.33 0.18 0.22 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.06 0.13
BR_2  0.94                            0.69 -3.60 -3.34 -0.11 0.02 0.22 0.35 0.36 0.01 0.07 0.28 0.30 0.41
   0.30                            0.34 0.34 0.32 0.12 0.26 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.29 0.10 0.21
PL_1  -0.02                            -0.27 0.09 0.15 -0.33 -0.08 0.08 -0.25 0.03 0.32 -0.18 -0.69 -0.08 0.18
   0.13                            0.21 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.25 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.09 0.10
PL_2  0.69                            -0.14 0.71 0.53 0.19 -0.18 -1.16 -0.67 0.05 0.17 0.11 0.21 -0.08 0.00
   0.14                            0.24 0.17 0.19 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.24 0.09 0.13
PL_3  0.77                            -0.03 1.45 0.31 0.12 1.06 0.05 0.50 -3.39 -0.16 0.84 -0.80 0.03 -0.31
   0.63                            0.43 0.51 0.34 0.36 0.45 0.37 0.38 0.90 0.52 0.73 0.65 0.33 0.27
PL_4  0.56                            0.31 0.34 0.33 -0.11 -0.52 -0.01 0.09 0.25 -0.31 -1.53 -0.91 0.26 0.51
   0.18                            0.18 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.31 0.34 0.13 0.12
All-
Other  -0.47                            -0.13 0.28 0.63 -0.38 0.10 -0.49 -0.33 -0.12 -0.42 -0.03 1.00 -1.57 -3.17
   0.15                            0.39 0.15 0.41 0.12 0.27 0.11 0.26 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.36 0.20 0.34
*Italicized numbers are the Standard errors.  *BR: Branded; PL: Private label; S/L: Skim/Low Fat; W: Whole      
                 
Table 6:  Price Elasticity Matrix for MW_1 
BR_1 PL_1
S / LWS / LWS / LWS / LW
BR_1 -4.46 -2.98 0.68 0.31 2.02 0.64 -0.23 0.44
0.56 0.35 0.25 0.16 0.42 0.28 0.34 0.26
PL_1 0.90 0.79 -1.46 -1.39 -0.73 -0.40 0.10 0.71
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.16 0.15 0.22 0.28
PL_2 2.93 1.53 -0.46 -0.42 -2.31 -1.16 0.22 0.10
0.49 0.43 0.16 0.16 0.46 0.51 0.32 0.33
All-Other 0.08 0.43 0.11 0.19 -0.16 -0.22 -1.04 -1.86
0.19 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.23
*Italicized numbers are the Standard errors. *BR: Branded; PL: Private label; S/L: Skim/Low Fat; W: Whole
PL_2 All-Other
 
§ Elasticity estimates in each cell corresponds to  ij η : percentage change quantity demanded of i to 1% change in price of j. 
 
  19Table 7: Concentration Measures by City 
WE_3 4,828 93.4 79.4 2 67 11 10.5
MW_2 2,706 97.7 61.9 1 39 22 9.5
WE_2 6,804 96.8 90.8 2 82 6 8.1
WE_1 6,403 99.6 96.1 3 78 10 10.1
SO_2 6,062 96.6 93.1 6 76 10 8.2
SO_1 5,007 96.7 85.3 6 68 12 9.9
NE_1 3,771 96.4 78.0 4 54 20 13.7
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Endnotes 
i An alternative is the GMM framework developed by Banks, Blundell, and Lewbell. 
ii Dairy Industry: Information on Milk Prices and Changing Market Structure. U.S. G.A.O Report, January 
2001. 
iii Note that processors pay the same price to farmers for all any types of milk and this price is governed by 
the federal milk marketing order (FMMO). 
iv For a detailed discussion please refer to Mittelhammer, Judge and Miller (p.474-475).  
v Due to space limitations, we report only related econometric results. More complete reports of the results 
are available from the authors on request.  
vi All the results by city are available from the authors on request. 
vii Note, however, that at the city level there is considerable evidence of strong substitute cross price effects at 
the branded level for both skim/low fat and while milks. Aggregation across cites obscures these significant 
details. 
viii Government Accounting Office, Report of Congressional Requesters, Dairy Industry – Information on 
Milk Prices and Changing Market Structure. June 2001, GAO-01-561. 
ix We did conduct phone surveys on retailer managers to know about the source of their Private Labels. We 
were not highly successful in the interview processes due to the sensitive nature of the information.  But from 
anecdotal sources we came to know that in most markets the number of Private Label processors is very low. 
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